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KIRK GARDNER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Case No. 990080 - CA 
vs. 
Priority No. 15 
PERRY CITY and BRAD WILKINSON, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 10-9-403 ARE PLAIN AND VALID 
In Point I of their respective briefs, Appellees deny that Section 10-9-403 (l)(b), Utah 
Code should be read to require the Perry City Council to refer the January 21, 1998 
recommendation back to the Planning Commission prior to the Council's February 28, 1998 
zoning amendment action(s). Appellees contend that the statutory system for land-use 
regulation would be turned on its head if the legislative body must refer a rezone matter back 
to the Planning Commission. Appellees also claim that the reference in Subsection (2) to the 
preceding Section 10-9-402 specifically allows the City Council to make whatever changes it 
1 
deems appropriate to zoning amendment recommendations from the Planning Commission. 
Both of these arguments ignore the primary rule for statutory construction, recently 
summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in Boulder Mountain Lodge v. Town of Boulder, 373 
Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1999): 
When interpreting a statute, this Court's "primary goal is to give effect 
to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve." . . . "The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the 
Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the Act." . . . 
Accordingly, we "look first to the plain language of the statute and assume 
that each of its terms was used advisedly. The language is therefore read 
literally unless such a reading proves to be unreasonably confused or 
inoperable. . . . " 
Id., at 7 (citations omitted). 
The language of Section 10-9-403(l)(b) is plain. Subsection (l)(a) clearly states what 
the legislative body "may amend."1 Subsection (l)(b) clearly states conditions under which 
the legislative body "may not make" such amendments. It unmistakably prohibits Council 
action on "any amendment... unless the amendment was proposed by the planning 
commission or is first submitted to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval, or 
recommendations." Appellant has earlier demonstrated that the Council's action did not 
match the rezone application or the corresponding planning commission recommendation. 
Under the rule of statutory construction expressed above, the plain language of Section 10-9-
403(1 )(b) must be adhered to unless it is "unreasonably confused or inoperable." 
1
 These include amendments to "the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning 
district" per subsection (l)(a)(I), such as the rezone in question. 
2 
1. § 10-9-403(l)(b) Does Not Upset the Statutory Zoning System 
Appellees worry that the statutory requirement that the Planning Commission first 
review changes proposed by the Council necessarily hands over to the Planning Commission 
legislative powers and functions reserved for the legislative body. This imagined usurpation, 
they say, turns the statutory system for municipal land use upside down. The opposite is true. 
If Appellees had their way, a Perry City could negate the power and duty of its Planning 
Commission to review rezone proposals by reshaping other proposals that the Planning 
Commission reviewed before the Council's permutations. "The planning commission shall:. 
. . recommend zoning ordinances and maps, and amendments to zoning ordinances and maps, 
to the legislative body as provided in this chapter." § 10-9-204(2), Utah Code. There is no 
point to empowering the commission to hold hearings, deliberate, and bring its advisory 
expertise to bear on the question of a rezone recommendation if the Council can wilfully turn 
the rezone decision into something that was never before the commission. The state 
legislature adopted the explicit language of subsection (l)(b) advisedly. It is consistent with 
the duties imposed by statute on planning commissions. 
Appellees warn that following subsection (l)(b) could result in labyrinthine 
procedures in which the Planning Commission retains effective control over the Council's 
decisions. But there is nothing in the statute that requires a council to accept 
recommendations from the planning commission. Even if a planning commission rejects a 
proposed amendment, the Council can grant the rezone petition. The statutory requirement 
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that midstream changes go back to the planning commission is an appropriate way of 
ensuring that planning commissions review all proposed changes to the zoning ordinance, 
regardless of whether they are in the form of a new petition or a change to an old petition. 
Because the Council retains the decision-making power, none of the evils perceived by 
Appellees exist in the system. But even if these claimed troubles were real, the Utah 
Legislature has clearly outlined the procedure; it should not be changed by judicial action. 
2. Sections 402 and 403 Are Congruent 
Appellees see irreconcilable conflicts in the way § 10-9-403 operates and the 
provisions of § 10-9-402. In Subsection 403(2) the following cross-reference appears: 
The legislative body shall comply with the procedure specified in 
Section 10-9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the zoning 
ordinance or the zoning map." 
Section 402 outlines the procedure for the adoption of a zoning ordinance. Subsection (1) 
describes the proceedings before the planning commission, which under Section 402 "shall 
prepare and recommend to the legislative body a proposed zoning ordinance, including the 
full text of the zoning ordinance and maps,. . .". Subsection (2) describes the procedure for 
getting the zoning ordinance before the Council, including provisions for notice and hearing. 
Subsection (3) provides that after the hearing, the Council has three choices: 
(a) adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed; 
(b) amend the zoning ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning 
ordinance as amended; or 
(c) reject the ordinance. 
Section 10-9-402(3), Utah Code. 
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By cross-referencing Section 403(2) to the "procedure specified in Section 10-9-402" 
(emphasis added), the Utah Legislature must have intended that notice and hearing are the 
same for amendments to an existing zoning ordinance as they are for the original adoption of 
the entire zoning ordinance. The text of Section 402 obviously applies to the initial 
"[preparation and adoption" of an entire zoning ordinance; the text of Section 403 obviously 
applies to "Amendments and rezonings,"as the respective titles to those sections also 
indicate. 
Appellees argue the "procedure specified in Section 10-9-402" includes the Council's 
option under 10-9-402(3)(b) to amend and immediately adopt a recommendation. This 
argument fails for several reasons. Such a construction pits Subsection 402(3)(b) in 
irreconcilable conflict with Subsection 403(l)(b): one subsection gives the Council the power 
to make immediate changes, while the other prohibits the Council from making changes 
without sending the changes back to the Planning Commission. Appellees' construction 
makes Sections 402 and 403 effectively identical. The strain Appellees' approach places on 
the texts of the two Sections is manifest in Appellees' odd quotation of Section 403(b), where 
in three places the word "ordinance" is replaced with "[amendment]". See Perry City Brief, 
Page l l .2 
There is no real conflict in the two provisions. Under Section 402, the planning 
commission makes an initial draft of the zoning ordinance. After notice and hearing, the 
2Regarding statutory interpretation, Brad Wilkinson adopted Perry City's arguments by 
reference. See Wilkinson Brief, Page 6, note 1. 
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Council can accept, reject, or change the zoning ordinance without first having to send it back 
to the planning commission. This is a sensible, practical approach to the establishment of the 
zoning regime because the number of possible versions of a comprehensive zoning ordinance 
is nearly limitless, with each variable needing to be considered in relation to numerous other 
unfixed variables. The Utah Legislature, whether wisely or unwisely, chose to make the 
comprehensive zoning ordinance a document initiated once in the Planning Commission, and 
decided on once in the Council. Section 403 is different. Now that the zoning regime is in 
place, amendments to it are, by definition, not comprehensive. Each proposed change or 
rezone can be and must be viewed individually. With far fewer variables in play, the 
Planning Commission and Council can each pay closer attention to the details of the 
proposed change, and can give better consideration to the effect of a change on the other 
now-fixed provisions of the zoning ordinance. It does not matter what the policy was behind 
the differences in Sections 402 and 403 or whether there was a policy reason for the two 
provisions, those differences exist because the legislature intended them to exist. There is 
nothing inconsistent in the two provisions since they apply in two different circumstances. 
II. ORDINANCE 2.3(4) IS VALID AND WAS PLAINLY VIOLATED 
1. Standard of Review 
Appellees responded with several arguments to the Appellant's point that Perry 
Ordinance 2.3 was violated. Much of Appellees' argument was devoted to the question 
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whether the alterations made by the Council on February 26, 1998 were sufficient to 
constitute a "change" or whether a "substantive" change was needed to trip the requirement 
of Planning Commission review. Appellees did not respond directly to the more basic issue 
of what standard would be applied to determine if the recommendation was "changed."3 
Mentioned throughout Brad Wilkinson's Brief is the notion that if there is any reasonable 
basis to justify the City's actions, they should be upheld, citing Sandy City v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1990). This is not the standard applicable to this case. As 
pointed out in the pleadings, in the Brief of Appellant (See P. 13), and as acknowledged by 
Brad Wilkinson (See Wilkinson Brief P. 9), in this case the City's actions are challenged on 
the basis of illegality. There is still a presumption of validity, but the presumption is 
overcome upon a showing that the City failed to "strictly comply" with its own ordinances. 
Since the matter was decided against Appellant on summary judgment, the facts must be 
construed in a light most favorable to Appellant on the question, among others, whether the 
Perry City Council "changed" the Planning Commission recommendation. 
As they did with the enabling statute, Appellees urge a strained and unreasonable 
construction of Perry City Ordinance 2.3, based on theories that Section 10-9-402 invalidates 
the ordinance, and that Perry City's interpretation should control. 
3On the issue of whether the ordinance was violated, Appellant proposed a "correctness" 
standard of appellate review. See Gardner Brief, Pages 1-2, Issue 1. Neither of the Appellees 
challenged or restated the issue, and neither suggested a different standard of review in the 
appropriate section of their respective Briefs, indicating they were "not dissatisfied" with 
Appellant's statements. See Rule 24(b)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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2. Ordinance 2.3 Is Valid 
The issue of the application of Section 10-9-402 has been discussed above. It is not 
in conflict with either Section 403 or the corresponding Perry City Ordinance 2.3. By statute, 
a city may elect to have zoning ordinances more strict and imposing higher standards than 
those required by the enabling statute. Section 10-9-104(1), Utah Code. If Ordinance 2.3 is 
stricter than either Section 402 or 403, such higher standard is still within Perry City's power 
to enact. Brad Wilkinson's expression of this argument is less subtle than that of the City; 
Brad Wilkinson says Ordinance 2.3 is invalid. Wilkinson Brief, P. 16. These arguments are 
late on two counts. Perry City passed the ordinance in the first place. And neither of the 
Appellees raised the question of the validity of the ordinance with the trial court. They have 
not preserved the issue for this appeal. 
3. The Requirements of Ordinance 2.3 Are Clear and Mandatory 
Appellees try to bootstrap the City's position by referring to the challenged action as a 
special interpretation by the legislative body of its procedural ordinance. The Court should 
have no regard for the City's interpretation because it directly contradicts the plain language 
of the ordinance. It is true that the Council decided their "adjustments" and actions did not 
involve "any change" under the ordinance. It is true that the Council decided, at least 
implicitly, that the ordinance phrases "shall refer such change back" and "shall start over at 
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Step 1" were not mandatory in nature.4 Such an interpretation is untenable. Herr v. Salt Lake 
County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974). In the face of the clear directives of the ordinance, the 
City's self-serving view that it has followed the ordinance cannot be afforded any weight. It 
is no surprise that the City thinks it acted properly. If such expressions were binding, every 
attempt at judicial review would be fruitless. 
Appellees claim that only "substantive" changes are to be referred back to the 
Planning Commission. These arguments fail because they presuppose the existence of an 
ambiguity in this unmistakably clear ordinance. Yet they reveal an underlying hypocrisy in 
the City's position. Like other municipalities chafing under their own ordinances, Perry City 
would like the power to transform procedural mandates into situational requirements. This 
Court should reject such attempts for the reasons stated in Springville Citizens v. City of 
Springville, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 26 (Utah 1999). 
Municipal zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of 
applicable zoning ordinances and are not at liberty to make land use decisions 
in derogation thereof. See Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 444-45 
(Utah 1981). The irony of the City's position on appeal is readily apparent: 
the City contends that it need only "substantially comply" with its ordinances 
it has legislatively deemed to be mandatory. Stated simply, the City cannot 
"change the rules halfway through the game." Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 
P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The City was not entitled to disregard 
its mandatory ordinances. 
4In an effort to distinguish Springville Citizens v. City of Springville, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23 (Utah 1999), Appellees argue that because Perry City has not specifically defined "must" and 
"shall" in its ordinances as mandatory terms, "must" and "shall" as used in Perry City ordinances 
are not mandatory. Such terms are plain and mandatory in nature, regardless of the existence of a 
specific ordinance defining them as such. When Perry City expects compliance with its 
ordinances by citizens, it considers the "shall" and "must" words to be mandatory. 
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Perry City Ordinance 2.3 is valid and clear. Compliance with its provision is not 
optional. 
4. Ordinance 2.3 Was Violated 
Brad Wilkinson leads off his argument with the claim that Appellant has not 
preserved error5 with regard to one of the changes made by the Council to the Planning 
Commission recommendation. He claims that there is no support in the record for the fact 
that the property of unwilling owners was dragged into the rezone during the February 26, 
1998 Council hearing. This attack on Appellant's Brief is factually unfounded. There is 
ample support in the record regarding this change. Brad Wilkinson refers the Court to page 
14 of Appellant's Brief for the supposedly "unsupported" fact allegation. The facts were first 
mentioned in Appellant's Statement of Facts, numbers 19 and 20 at page 9. These facts 
included quotes and paraphrases from the record, the source of which was Perry City's 
minutes of the Council meeting of February 26, 1998, attached to an affidavit and made a part 
of Appellant's motion for summary judgment. Far from being obscure, the minutes clearly 
reflect the accuracy of Appellant's statements of fact. Following are unabridged excerpts of 
the exchange which Appellant pointed to as an example among many of the changes wrought 
by the Council: 
Following a Council discussion on the remaining property requested for re-
zone, Judy Bylsma reminded the council that when rezoning no islands can be 
5Under the heading "Plaintiff Presents a Spurious Fact Issue which Was Non-Existent at 
the Trial Court Level." Wilkinson Brief Pp. 6-8. 
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left within the zone. Councilman Steven Pettingill pointed out there is also a 
peninsula left on the north end of Sunridge Subdivision. 
MOTION: Councilman Bruce Payne made a motion to approve zone change 
from present zoning to Rl for all remaining zone change petitioners excluding 
the Wilkinson property, the Sunridge Subdivision, Robert Jenson and Jerry 
Capener properties. To include all islands and peninsulas not attached to 
petition. Seconded by Councilman Carol Billings. Councilman Bruce Payne, 
Carol Billings and Desmond Thomas voted in favor. Councilman Steven 
Pettingill voted against the motion. 
Dave Curtis strongly disapproved of rezoning his property without his 
permission or proper notice. Mayor Allen warned that major changes were 
being made without proper procedure being followed. These changes will 
have a major impact on people and all issues have not been addressed. 
R. 85-86. The particulars of this change were discussed at length during the hearing on 
summary judgment. Most of the above passage was read out loud to the trial court. Tr. 13-
15. Judge Judkins inquired specifically about the facts am claimed significance of the 
change, and counsel for Brad Wilkinson and Appellant both expressed their views. Tr. 23-
28. The facts on which Appellant claimed that Perry City added unwilling landowners to the 
rezone were direct, clear, well documented, and properly included in the record in minutes 
prepared by the City. It was not "Plaintiffs speculations" as Brad Wilkinson asserts. 
Wilkinson Brief, P. 7. 
Brad Wilkinson attempts to minimize the import of the "added owner" change by 
mischaracterizing statements made by Appellant's counsel during argument on the motions 
for summary judgment. The claim is that Appellant "conceded and stipulated" the issue 
away. Wilkinson Brief, Pp. 7-8. The issue of the addition of non-petition property as an 
impermissible change is still before this Court. After the detailed facts about the added 
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property were cited at the hearing, the trial court and counsel for Brad Wilkinson inquired 
about whether the added property was included in the scope of the notice. Counsel for 
Appellant conceded that the notice was worded broadly enough to have encompassed the 
"islands" and "peninsulas" within its outer boundaries. Appellant maintained, however, that 
the added property was not included in the petition for rezone. Since the Planning 
Commission adopted the petition as its recommendation to the Council, the property added 
by the Council was not in the recommendation. The Council therefore changed the 
recommendation as it concerned the added property.. Under the ordinance a change in the 
recommendation is sufficient to trigger a return trip to the Planning Commission regardless 
of the absence of discrepancies between the notice and the Council's action. This sequence 
was explained several times to the trial court. The argument that the Council changed the 
recommendation of the Planning Commission has been reiterated in the Brief of Appellant at 
pages 11, 13-15, and 20. Appellant preserved this issue for appeal. Appellant has never 
waived this issue. Appellant has never conceded facts which would lead to a different result. 
The tacked-on property is one of several significant changes made by the Council 
contrary to Ordinance 2.3. 
III. THE SUBDIVISION ISSUE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
Perry City and Appellant both argued that the validity of the Subdivision depends on 
the validity of the preceding rezone. For the first time in any of these proceedings, Brad 
Wilkinson argues in his brief that the subdivision question is "time-barred". Brad Wilkinson 
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admits that the issue of timeliness was not mentioned in the proceedings below. He claims 
that this Court should nonetheless consider the argument because the issue is "jurisdictional." 
There is no question that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, including 
Appellant's claim that the subdivision fails because the rezone fails. All parties, including 
Brad Wilkinson, admitted in the "Statement of Jurisdiction" section of their respective briefs 
that this Court has jurisdiction. The question whether an action is timely filed in the District 
Court is one of limitations. Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974) dealt with 
the administrative appeal from one county entity to another, and interpreted the "shall" 
provisions tied to time as mandatory. Brad Wilkinson did not raise the defense of limitations 
below, and so should be precluded from arguing the matter on appeal. Tygesen v. Magna 
Water Co., 375 P.2d 456 (Utah 1962); see also Rules 8(c) and 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The amended complaint need not have been filed within thirty days after the City's 
decision on the subdivision. The original complaint was already on file at the time of the 
decision on the subdivision. The original complaint sought the following relief: "For a 
preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the [City] from implementing or enforcing 
the Council's February 26, 1998 decisions." R. 22. Approval of the subdivision is one of the 
actions Appellant sought to enjoin. The amendment of the complaint specified one of the 
actions taken pursuant to the rezone. For limitations purposes, the amendment relates back to 
13 
the original complaint.6 Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Brad Wilkinson asserts that each action of the City must be separately (and timely) 
appealed to the district court. But Appellant's claim to the subdivision's invalidity stems 
directly from the invalidity of the rezone. All other actions taken pursuant to the rezone, 
including the recording of the plat, the issuance of building permits on restricted lots, etc. fall 
with the rezone. The inclusion of Brad Wilkinson as a party makes it impossible for him to 
claim he was unaware of the problems associated with the rezone. What Brad Wilkinson 
does in reliance on the rezone, including the development of the subdivision, he clearly does 
at the risk that his development will be undone by later judicial action. Much as he dislikes 
it, Brad Wilkinson's characterization of Appellant's argument on this point is an accurate 
statement of the law:7 
In essence, Plaintiff argues that the City must stop transacting business 
regarding the rezoned property, or that all subsequent City decisions will be 
subject to invalidation, pending the outcome of Plaintiff s suit. 
Wilkinson Brief, P. 17. The City can elect to continue issuing permits and approving lots 
6Arguably, the causes of action against Brad Wilkinson as a defendant do not relate back 
to the filing of the complaint because Brad Wilkinson was a new party who probably had no 
identity of interest with Perry City. But the timeliness issue does not hinge on the claim against 
Brad Wilkinson. 
7Brad Wilkinson asserts that Appellant has not cited legal authority to this effect. At 
Page 18 of Appellant's Brief the case of Chambers v. Smithfield, 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986) was 
cited for the proposition that "Appellees are precluded from claiming financial or other harm will 
result from the undoing of the Wilkinson Subdivision." In addition, Appellant quoted from 
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 (Utah 1978) and cited several other cases to show 
that all persons with notice of the litigation are subject to its ultimate outcome. See Appellant's 
Brief Pp. 18-19. 
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pending litigation, but all that takes place will be subject to judicial review. Those who 
unknowingly rely on the City's subsequent actions will be protected from harm. Brad 
Wilkinson does not qualify as an innocently unaware party. Neither does anyone who, with 
actual or constructive knowledge of this litigation, purchased or improved any rezoned 
property relying on the validity of the rezone. 
Once the challenge was timely made to the rezone, it came within the power of the 
district court to declare the rezone invalid. The City cannot deprive the district court of its 
prerogative by taking later actions in furtherance of the rezone. 
IV. THE LIS PENDENS SHOULD REMAIN PENDING APPEAL 
Appellees both defended the district court's order "releasing" the lis pendens. Brad 
Wilkinson argues that it was incumbent on Appellant to move to stay the court's release order 
and post a supersedeas bond. Perry City argues that the lis pendens is automatically removed 
upon final judgment, and if notice of the appeal is necessary, a new lis pendens should be 
filed. In a sense, Appellees are making these arguments not for themselves but for non-
parties who may later appear and claim they are not subject to the litigation because they 
acquired property in good faith during a time when the lis pendens was not in effect. The 
case cited by all parties on this point, Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996), was at a 
stage similar to the instant one when it was decided on appeal. It was not known whether 
there were any purchasers who had acquired interests during a gap in the lis pendens. The 
matter was remanded to the trial court to determine if such purchasers existed and what their 
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level of knowledge was concerning the litigation. In the instant case, the possibility of a good 
faith purchaser is slim.8 Nonetheless, the Court should overturn the trial court's order and 
clarify the rules regarding lis pendens and appeals so that trial courts, litigants and title 
insurance companies can proceed with minimal confusion. 
As mentioned before, a lis pendens is a mechanism by which third parties are made 
aware of the existence of litigation and of the potential effect on real property of the 
litigation's outcome. The presupposition of the Timm opinion is that if a trial court 
"releases" a lis pendens, third party purchases are not thereafter on notice of the pendency of 
the litigation. A search of real property records would reveal the existence of a lis pendens 
and a "release".9 At this point a reasonably prudent purchaser would know that although 
litigation was pending, the trial judge determined that it could have no effect on the property. 
The problem is that the litigation isn't necessarily over, and the trial judge's determinations 
are subject to reversal on appeal. A reasonably diligent purchaser would still be on inquiry 
notice of that potential regardless of the trial judge's order. Until the time for appeal has 
passed, or until a final non-appealable ruling is made by an appellate court, the case is still 
pending, and the original lis pendens is effective to supply notice. 
The Utah Supreme Court has already determined that a lis pendens filed during lower 
8Counsel for Appellant addressed the problems associated with lis pendens and appeals in 
a letter to the Court dated January 7, 1999. R. 191-92. In that letter, Appellant's counsel 
mentioned the possible filing of another lis pendens during appeal "[t]o avoid confusion and 
preserve [Appellant's] rights to an effective appeal." R. 191. 
9Perry City argues that entry of a final judgment has the same effect as a specific order 
releasing the lis pendens. 
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court proceedings is effective to provide notice of a later appeal from those proceedings. 
Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979). The Timm case dealt 
with an interlocutory order "releasing" the lis pendens. The Utah Supreme Court found error 
in the trial judge's release order, and "reinstated" the lis pendens on the unexpressed 
assumption that during the interim third parties were not put on notice of the suit by the 
earlier lis pendens. The case at bar presents a hybrid of the Hidden Meadows and Timm 
cases. This litigation ended in the trial court and Appellant filed this appeal. Following 
Hidden Meadows, the old lis pendens would provide notice to third parties of the pendency of 
the appeal. However, in the same order that terminated the litigation below, Judge Judkins 
"dissolved" the lis pendens. Under the Timm approach, the effectiveness of the "released" lis 
pendens would be suspended until "reinstated" by this Court. These two approaches should 
be reconciled bearing in mind the purpose of lis pendens. 
The doctrine of lis pendens preserves the status quo by keeping the 
subject of the lawsuit within the power and control of the court until a 
judgment or decree [or decision not subject to further appeal] shall be 
entered. The recording of a lis pendens serves as a warning to all persons that 
any rights or interests they may acquire in the interim are subject to the 
judgment or decree [or decision on appeal], 
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978) (citations omitted)(italics 
added as paraphrase). 
Appellant submits that the approach which best serves the purpose of lis pendens and 
promotes clarity and certainty in real estate transactions is to treat interim orders "releasing" 
lis pendens as ineffectual to remove constructive notice of the pending litigation. A trial 
court should not prohibit a litigant from providing actual notice to third parties of the 
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pendency of litigation. The trial court should be no more capable of interfering with 
constructive notice. 
V. APPELLANT HAS MET ALL PREREQUISITES FOR RELIEF 
In Point V of Brad Wilkinson's brief, he relies heavily on Springville Citizens v. City 
of Springy Me, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 for his assertion that Appellant is not entitled to relief 
because, supposedly, no "prejudice" has been shown.10 The passage of Springville Citizens 
highlighted by this contention reads as follows: 
The City's failure to pass the legality requirement of section 10-9-
1001(3)(b), however, does not automatically entitle plaintiffs to the relief they 
request. Rather, plaintiffs must establish that they were prejudiced by the 
City's noncompliance with its ordinances or, in other words, how, if at all, the 
City's decision would have been different and what relief, if any, they are 
entitled to as a result. See, e.g., Board of Ed. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 
1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) (noting that recovery for failure of county to follow 
mandatory statutory requirements required showing of prejudice from such 
failure); see also Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 11.24 (explaining that 
party challenging approval of P.U.D. must show "actual injury"). 
Id., 365 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. 
10Brad Wilkinson goes on to claim that it was shown that Appellant did not suffer 
prejudice. The facts cited for this proposition, dealing with a second attempted subdivision 
approval and second lawsuit are not appropriately before the Court. Brad Wilkinson argued to 
the trial court that a second round of approval made the present litigation "moot." Tr. 20, 28. 
The trial court properly determined that that matter was not before the court and would not be 
considered. Tr. 33. 
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1. Appellant Has Standing to Challenge the City's Actions 
The Utah Legislature has established the criterion for standing to challenge municipal 
zoning decisions in the district court. "Any person adversely affected by any decision . . 
may file a petition for review of the decision in the district court.. ." Section 10-9-1001(2), 
Utah Code. In connection with the motion for summary judgment, Appellant testified that he 
was adversely affected by the City's decisions, and provided factual details as to his standing. 
Affidavit of Kirk Gardner, ^f 6-8, R. 104. Appellant included the facts regarding standing in 
the Statement of Facts in the accompanying memorandum. Memorandum Supporting 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Statements of Fact 1-4, R. 49-50. Appellees did not contest 
any of the facts claimed by Appellant, and so they were deemed admitted under Rule 4-
501(2)(B), C.J.A. The facts regarding Appellant's status as a person "adversely affected" by 
the City's decisions, together with all other facts stated in the Memorandum, have been 
referred to all along as stipulated. See discussion at Page 6 of the Brief of Appellant. 
Appellant has clearly qualified as a person who, according to the legislature, can 
challenge the City's actions. The statutory standard is "adversely affected." If the showing 
of "prejudice" mentioned in Springville Citizens is a different standard, it is judicially 
imposed on those who seek relief other than or additional to that afforded by the appeals 
provisions of Section 10-9-1001.11 
nThe Springville Citizens decision qualifies the application of the "prejudice" by 
referring to "the relief they [plaintiffs] request." The case cited in the opinion as supporting a 
"prejudice" requirement obviously deals with relief other than review of a decision under Section 
10-9-1001, namely recovery of damages. 
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2. The City's Actions Are Void Regardless of "Prejudice" 
An appeal to the district court from a land use decision is strictly limited in scope by 
the statute authorizing the appeal. Appellee's have made frequent reference to the 
presumption of validity mandated in Section 10-9-100 l(3)(a). Subsection (b) provides for 
additional limitations, which are very pertinent to the "prejudice" issue raised by Brad 
Wilkinson. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
The statute is clearly mandatory ("shalF) and restrictive ("only"). The moment a district 
court goes beyond the question of "adversely affected" and adds a requirement of "prejudice" 
before declaring a City's action invalid, it steps outside the bounds of its statutory review 
authority.12 There are several policy reasons why the "prejudice" showing should not be 
superimposed on the appeals process. City officials could feel they have carte blanche to err 
in procedure if each time a challenge is brought, they can uniformly defend by claiming the 
same decision would have been made regardless of procedural defects. No matter how the 
policy debate over "prejudice" would shape up, the decision to include or exclude such a 
requirement rests exclusively with the legislature. So far, no "prejudice" requirement exists. 
12Admittedly, the language of the Springville Citizens opinion could be read to permit 
judicial tampering with the statutory elements necessary to overturn a zoning decision. Because 
the potential conflict between a "showing of prejudice" requirement and Section 10-9-100 l(3)(b) 
is never discussed in the opinion, it is doubtful the issue was discemibly briefed. See Springville 
Citizens, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27, note 2. 
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CONCLUSION 
The requirements imposed by statute and ordinance in the event of a desired change 
to a zoning amendment are explicit. Those requirements do not conflict with other statutes or 
ordinances, but rather are consistent with the purposes and overall system for municipal land 
use regulation. Perry City's Council violated the requirements by substantially changing the 
Planning Commission's recommendation. 
The objection to the subdivision approval was subordinate to and inherent in 
Appellant's challenge to the rezone, and was therefore not time barred. In any case, Brad 
Wilkinson has waived the limitations defense by not raising it in the trial court. 
This Court should declare the trial court's attempt to dissolve the lis pendens to be 
null. The lis pendens continues to impart constructive notice of the litigation as long as 
appeal rights have not expired, notwithstanding the trial court's order. 
Finally, the uncontested facts show that Appellant has standing to bring this action, 
and the statutory requisites for a favorable outcome have been met notwithstanding any 
"prejudice" argument. 
DATEDAugustll , 1999. 
BARRETT & DAINES 
Christopher L. Daines 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of August, 1999,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to 
each of the following: 
Keith M. Backman 
Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones 
4605 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Melvin E. Smith and Gary R. Williams 
Smith, Knowles & Hamilton 
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Christopher L. Daines 
Attorney for Appellant 
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